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Late this summer, General Pervez
Musharraf-Pakistan's self-appointed
president and chief executive-delivered
yet another devastating blow to the
country's democratic prospects. At an
August 21 press conference, Musharraf
announced 29 new amendments to the
constitution that vastly strengthened the
powers of the military and the executive.
Among other prerogatives, these amend-
ments gave the president (who will be
Musharraf for at least the next five years,
thanks to the fraud-ridden "referendum"
held in April) the power to dismiss
Pakistan's legislature-effectively making
all of parliament's actions subject to
his approval. Another innovation, the
National Security Council, formally in-
stitutionalized the already pervasive role
of the military in the country's politics.
Musharraf's fiats were just the latest
in a 45-year-long saga of military assaults
on Pakistan's body politic. For most of
its history, the country's military-often
with the complicity of other key elements
of the Pakistani state, such as the civilian
bureaucracy and even, on occasion, the
judiciary-has seemed intent only on
maintaining its own prospects and prerog-
atives. This single-minded determination
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has brought the country several coups,
ill-considered alliances, and disastrous
military operations against India.
Musharraf himself came to power in
one such coup, in October 1999. The gen-
eral took office promising to restore order,
instill probity in public life, and promote
social justice. But his dictatorial prede-
cessors had made similar pledges, and
Pakistan's military regimes have never
delivered long-term economic prosperity
or political stability. Instead, they have
consistently skewed the distribution of
wealth and income, made the develop-
ment of honest and effective political
parties nearly impossible, undermined
the independence of the judiciary, and
exacerbated the underlying weaknesses of
the Pakistani state. And so far Musharraf's
rule has offered no exception to this
depressing trend.
This time, however, Washington can-
not afford to ignore the mismanagement
in Islamabad. Pakistan's sorry status quo
and uncertain future are of critical signifi-
cance. As the United States seeks to uproot
the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban,
it remains acutely dependent on Pakistan's
stability and well-being, not to mention its
cooperation. Moreover, the long-running
tensions between India and Pakistan now
have significance far beyond the subconti-
nent, thanks to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by both sides. The United States
is thus very concerned indeed to ensure
that their recurrent tiffs do not spiral into
full-scale war. And if the world hopes
to stanch the growth of fundamentalist
Islam, turning Pakistan toward democracy
and away from venal, autocratic rule
will be imperative.
Key to that effort will be learning how
Pakistan got to where it is today, and
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how to leverage U.S.-Pakistani ties to
improve governance from Islamabad.
Fortunately, three authors who have spent
significant periods of time in Pakistan
have recently produced books that should
be useful to the process. In his comprehen-
sive account of U.S.-Pakistan relations,
Dennis Kux, a former U.S. diplomat,
touches on many of the central develop-
ments in the latter country's coup-ridden
history. Journalist Mary Anne Weaver's
new book focuses on the interplay between
Pakistani politics and society. And Owen
Bennett Jones, another journalist, seeks
to uncover the deep sources of Pakistan's
critical ailments. Each book has its merits,
but Jones' work is far more analytically
probing than the other two and gives a
clearer picture of how Pakistan has arrived
at such a parlous state.
WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE
The root causes of Pakistan's economic
and political woes lie in its feudal society
and the winner-take-all approach to
governing that has been practiced by
successive civilian and military leaders.
The party that brought Pakistan inde-
pendence, the Muslim League, lacked
internal democracy. Once partition and
statehood had been achieved, the league,
dominated by upper-class landed gentry
from the former United Provinces of
British India, displayed scant interest
in forging a state that would promote
popular participation and equity. Although
they sought to free the Muslims of South
Asia from Hindu domination, Pakistan's
leaders failed to address the new state's
own ethnic diversity. This was a critical
shortcoming, for contrary to the political
rhetoric of Pakistan's founder, Mohammed
Ali Jinnah, the region's Muslims never
R S • Volume 8z No. 6
GETTY
I'll take that. Pervez Musharrafreceives apistoifrom
then Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif Skardu, Pakistan, September 1999
constituted an inchoate, monolithic nation.
Instead, a variety of Muslim communities
existed throughout British India, and these
communities were riven by sectarian, eth-
nic, and class cleavages.
After the creation of Pakistan, these
ethnic differences quickly came to the
fore. The new country's leaders showed
scant regard for representative institutions,
accommodative policies, or pluralism.
And when this neglect resulted in serious
political disorder less than ten years later,
the military stepped in, inaugurating what
would become a long tradition of seizing
power. In fact, since this initial coup in
1958, Pakistan has been ruled by its military
for more than half of its history. Even
when civilian governments have managed
to assume power, they have for the most
part been hamstrung by pressures and
demands from the military-the best-
organized entity in the country.
In forging Pakistan's foreign policy,
successive regimes have made matters
worse by further bolstering the military's
prerogatives. To do so, both civilian and
military rulers have exaggerated the threat
from India (asserting, for example, that
India seeks to repossess the entire territory
of Pakistan), single-mindedly fastened
on the unresolved Kashmir dispute, and
assiduously courted the United States as
a strategic ally.
The military alliance with the United
States has been the subject of considerable
polemic but little dispassionate examina-
tion from Pakistani, as well as Indian,
writers. Pakistani scholars, most notably
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the historian Ayesha Jalal, have sought
to blame the U.S.-Pakistan nexus and
India's putative aggressive posture for
Pakistan's pervasive militarism. For their
part, Indian academics, particularly the
historian Mannakal Venkataramani, have
argued that Pakistan's hostility toward
India was largely fueled by the former's
military relationship with the United
States. Kux's book, The United States and
Pakistan, 1947-2ooo: Disenchanted Allies,
provides a more disinterested account of
the creation and development of the
strategic relationship between Washington
and Islamabad. By thoroughly examining
the U.S. documentary record and inter-
viewing both American and Pakistani
decision-makers, Kux has revealed that
Washington's interest in such a relationship
was actually scant at first. It was only
Pakistan's adroit and sedulous diplomacy,
combined with India's refusal to align
with the United States during the early
Cold War, that led to the formation of
this bond. Kux also shows that, far from
encouraging Pakistani adventurism
against India, key individuals in various
American administrations have repeatedly
sought to thwart Islamabad's attempts
to inveigle the United States into adopt-
ing an uncritically pro-Pakistani posture
on Kashmir.
All the same, the U.S. friendship has
translated into substantial military and
economic assistance for Pakistan. And
such aid has further bolstered the prerog-
atives of Pakistan's military, thanks in
part to the weaknesses of the country's
civilian institutions. During the Cold
War, the United States agreed to ignore
Pakistan's internal arrangements as long
as its ally remained staunchly anticom-
munist. Free from any American pressure
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to pursue domestic political reform, Pak-
istan's military and its conservative civil
service skewed the nation's developmental
priorities, privileged the military's own
position, and did little to dismantle the
country's feudalistic, inegalitarian social
structures. Unlike neighboring India, for
example, Pakistan never undertook even a
modest program of land reform.
The debility of Pakistan's institutions
and its failure to modernize politically is
vividly portrayed in Weaver's Pakistan:
In the Shadow offihad andAfghanistan. In
some of the book's more striking vignettes,
she shows just how utterly unable Islam-
abad has been to control vast swaths of
territory in tribal Baluchistan and feudal
Sindh. In Baluchistan, tribal lords still
dispense justice based on local customs and
practices--in many cases simply ignoring
the laws of the Pakistani state. And Islam-
abad, for its part, has done little to bring
economic development to this vast, track-
less region where violent secessionism
remains prevalent. Despite devoting much
of her book to Sindh, however, Weaver
does not discuss one of the most critical
fault lines that cleaves the province: the
recrudescent violence between locals and
mohajirs (Muslims who immigrated from
India during and after partition).
Still, the anecdotes that Weaver uses
to paint her portrait of Pakistan provide
carefully crafted glimpses of its many
pathologies. Through an extended tale of
illegal falconry, for example, she shows
how sybaritic sheiks from the Persian Gulf
(most prominently from Saudi Arabia)
flagrantly violate Pakistan's laws governing
the hunting of endangered wildlife. Such
tales reveal the endemic corruption that
invariably emerges as state authority and
institutional order corrode.
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Many of Weaver's accounts, unfortu-
nately, have a breezy, chatty tenor that
entertains more than it informs. And
despite its current-events title, many of
the essays she includes were written sev-
eral years ago (in many cases for The
New Yorker) and are thus quite dated.
Although she has sought to update the
book to take account of more recent
events, Weaver's efforts feel a bit contrived.
For example, her long conversations with
Benazir Bhutto do illuminate the myriad
problems and challenges that a young,
Western-educated woman encountered
as the first female prime minister of a
deeply conservative and patriarchal
country. Yet these interviews offer few
insights into Pakistan's contemporary po-
litical realities, in which Bhutto's political
relevance is limited. Although Bhutto
continues to command some support
from her Pakistan People's Party and
segments of the electorate, her husband
(a former cabinet minister) languishes in
a Pakistani prison on corruption charges,
and she herself faces arrest if she returns
from exile. Bhutto's attempt to register as
a candidate for the October parliamentary
elections was quashed by the election
tribunal of the Sindh High Court. Under
these conditions, any political comeback
appears unlikely.
A DEAL WITH THE DEVIL
A more compelling analysis of Pakistan's
institutional weaknesses and the capri-
cious behavior of most of its leaders can
be found in Jones' Pakistan: Eye of the
Storm. This work leavens the historical
record with investigative reportage and
thoughtful judgments about Pakistan's
likely future. Jones relies less on anecdotes
than does Weaver, as he seeks to unravel
the key historical and political strands
that have brought the country to its
current plight.
His deft summary of the historical
forces that have contributed to the current
disaster will sound familiar to South Asia
specialists. But Jones is good at connecting
historical evidence to contemporary de-
velopments. For example, in a superb
and unsparing chapter on the army's role,
he shows how Pakistan's military rulers
have not only usurped political power
but have distorted the country's priorities
and sustained unremitting hostility toward
India. These dictators have also managed
to siphon off substantial economic re-
sources, even while accusing Pakistan's
civilian politicians of being the ones
who have raided the treasury. (Look at
the country's annual budgets, more than
a third of which goes to the military, and
it should become clear who has done the
bulk of the raiding.) Shielded from most
criticism and scrutiny, furthermore, the
army has pursued flawed strategies to
wrest Kashmir from India. To this end,
it has repeatedly made overly optimistic
assessments of its own prowess, uncriti-
cally assumed the reliability of potential
allies, and routinely underestimated India's
military tenacity and political resolve.
These decision-making pathologies
have cost Pakistan dearly in both blood
and treasure while bringing it no closer
to dislodging its enemy from Kashmir.
The flaws in Pakistan's leadership
have not been confined solely to the realm
of foreign policy. Military rulers (and, on
occasion, civilian regimes) have exacerbated
the country's ethnic and sectarian cleavages.
The greatest debacle, the secession of
Bangladesh in 1971 (which Jones describes
and assesses in some detail), stemmed
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from the overweening ambitions of a
civilian politician, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
(Benazir's father), and the callousness
of an inept military dictator, Yahya Khan.
General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, another
military ruler, made Pakistan's ethnic
and sectarian tensions still worse. Zia, in
attempts to bolster the legitimacy of his
own regime, actively courted religious
zealots within the country. During his
decade-long reign (from 1977 to 1988),
he instituted a separate Islamic court
system, encouraged the formation of
madrassas (religious schools, many of which
were funded by Saudi Arabia), and pro-
moted Islamist officers within the army.
These policies unleashed pernicious social
forces on Pakistan: most notably, Wah-
habism, a form of virulently intolerant
Islam that now threatens the cohesion
of the Pakistani state.
With the tacit consent of the CIA, Zia
directed the bulk of American aid dollars
to Islamist Afghan mujahideen. Benazir
Bhutto, his civilian successor, followed
essentially the same course under the
tutelage of her interior minister, General
Naseerullah Babar. In their quest for
"strategic depth" in the event of a war
with India, Bhutto and Babar connived
to foist the brutal (and, they hoped, pliant)
Taliban regime on Afghanistan-much
to the later detriment of that country,
the region, and the world.
Not content with promoting the inter-
ests of religious zealots at home and in
Afghanistan, General Zia directed many
of these condottierri toward the already-
troubled Indian-controlled portion of
Kashmir. Their heirs, most prominently
the militant groups Jaish-e-Mohammed
and Lashkar-i-Taiba, have engaged in
murder, mayhem, and rape in that region
while ostensibly seeking to free it from
Delhi's misrule. It was Pakistan's support
of these terrorists that led to yet another
confrontation with India earlier this year-
and brought the two countries to the brink
of full-scale war in June. It took
extraordinary intercessions from the
United States and other countries to
prevent such a conflict.
CRASH COURSE
Fourteen years after Zia's demise, the
strategic culture of Pakistan's military has
not changed, and it continues to pursue
foolhardy operations. The most recent
misadventure, the Kargil crisis of 1999,
came about a year after the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests. Jones provides
the most cogent and revealing account
of this crisis to date. He suggests that
Pakistan's military can be held almost
solely responsible for this singularly ill-
conceived adventure, which also brought
the countries to the brink of war. The
army high command, Jones reveals, had
started planning the operation in about
1994 in an attempt to disrupt India's
ability to supply its troops on the disputed
Siachen Glacier. Indian artillery barrages
that year interdicted Pakistani troop
movements and thwarted the original
invasion plans. But Pakistan's generals
were undeterred and decided to await a
more propitious moment. This came
after the 1998 nuclear tests; the army
assumed that India would not expand its
military operations for fear of provoking
a nuclear exchange. The generals were
also concerned that, after a decade, the
Kashmir insurgency-the raison d'ftre of
their high military budgets-was starting
to taper off. Finally, they calculated that
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, distracted
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by his efforts to improve relations with
India, would blithely approve what then
looked like a small tactical operation. As
Jones reveals, however, even the military
brass gave only scant thought to how to
actually secure the salients they planned
to capture-and this lack of foresight
doomed the operation from the start.
Sharif's willingness to seek a diplomatic
resolution to the crisis after it erupted
contributed to his overthrow in October
1999. Unlike during much of the Cold
War-when Washington overlooked the
many shortcomings of Islamabad's military
rulers-this time the United States sharply
upbraided Musharraf for his coup and
imposed new sanctions on Pakistan.
Indeed, the White House came close to
labeling Pakistan a state supporter of
terrorism due to its close links with the
Taliban. It was only after September u
that American policy toward Pakistan
underwent a fundamental shift, and
Islamabad once again became a close
military ally of Washington. Sadly, the
U.S. zeal in the war on terror seems to
have propelled it to adopt a deafening
silence toward Musharraf's abuses.
The unwillingness of Pakistan's elite
to induce political reform has ill-served
American interests, however. As Jones
depicts, military rule in Pakistan, partic-
ularly under Zia, spawned many of the
groups that the United States now so
ardently seeks to eliminate. The effect
of uncritical U.S. aid has been to extend
and strengthen the violent grip of the
Pakistani military.
This error is all the more tragic because
only the United States can force Pakistan to
reorder its domestic and external priorities.
In the absence of substantial American
economic assistance, diplomatic support,
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and multilateral loans, Pakistan would
plunge into economic distress and social
dislocation. Washington's clout is there-
fore enormous, and it could demand
meaningful and long-lasting changes to
address Pakistan's myriad woes. Whether
the United States will prod Musharraf
into changing the course he is so carefully
plotting-a route toward ever increasing
military dominance and ever more limited
democracy-remains uncertain, however.
Meanwhile, the fate of Pakistan's 140 mil-
lion citizens hangs in the balance.0
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